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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2016, revenues from music streaming services have surpassed those from 
physical sales and continues to grow; suggesting that this can now be regarded as 
the dominant form of music distribution. Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems 
lie at the heart of this trend and are crucial in this context; enabling such business 
models in the first place and subsequently protecting the content offered on such 
platforms. Whilst seemingly beneficial in terms of revenue and consumer welfare, 
this shift poses a number of important issues which this research will address. Music 
streaming services have changed the nature of the product offered. Musical content 
is becoming de-bundled and reduced to a series of permissions covered by DRM 
and associated licences which may leave users trapped in a permission-based 
system and which will be explored by analysing the content of End User Licence 
Agreements (EULAs) offered by the large streaming providers. This may also have 
consequences for the application for copyright law itself regarding personal 
ownership and exhaustion issues. The doctrine of exhaustion provides a limitation on 
the economic right of distribution and prevents copyright owners from controlling the 
subsequent distribution of a work once it has already been ‘sold’ in the market. This 
enables secondary markets to develop and operate for copyrighted content, but a 
combination of restrictive EULAs and DRM measures may negate the ability for such 
digital secondary markets to form.  
Although streaming marks a fundamental change from traditional copy-based 
distribution mechanisms, relevant case law from the US and Europe demonstrates 
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that it is not necessarily the case that digital markets already accommodate this 
principle. Nonetheless, these licences raise a number of significant issues in their 
own right for consumers and artists; they create costs in reading and understanding, 
are non-negotiable and arguably indistinguishable such that consumers’ ability to 
draw comparison and make informed decisions are undermined. They are more 
representative of the asymmetric power-dynamic between rights holders and 
consumers, and redefine consumers’ relationship with content by limiting the transfer 
of the ‘product’ to a series of permissions. This may have a number of further 
consequences which will be investigated. It is arguably more difficult for new artists 
to break into the charts, potentially damaging diversity, and recent research has also 
suggested that popular music composition is changing which may be creating new 
compositional norms artists have to conform to for commercial success. On a more 
technical level, but equally as importantly, the very nature of the Internet may be 
changing. The growth of DRM-supported streaming platforms highlights the 
importance of networks for content delivery. Whilst originally envisaged as a network 
free of technical control based on the end-to-end principle of system design, the 
Internet threatens to fragment with latent DRM control operating on and across the 
network and connected devices.  
The success seemingly enjoyed by music streaming providers suggests that these 
do not seem to be of much (if any) concern to the users of such services who appear 
to value the ease and convenience such services provide in comparison with content 
on physical media. Inevitably though, this trend is likely to continue and whilst 
copyright also remains centrally important, its focus is no longer on enforcing 
reproduction rights as the ‘copy’ has been removed from the equation. Instead, the 
role of copyright in this context is merely founding the initial proprietary rights that 
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enable subsequent DRM and licence-based online exploitation – going back to the 
future to re-establish record industry power allied now to streaming platforms. 
This piece will focus on US and EU jurisdictions as both have developed legal 
frameworks regulating DRM and whilst music is the primary focus, reference will be 
made to other copyright works for comparison where necessary. It will begin with an 
overview of DRM and its evolving nature in the context of music streaming; in 
particular, its history and early legal controversies can be seen with reference to the 
US. It will then explore the issue of secondary markets, tied to an analysis of both 
EULAs and comparable case law from the US and also Europe regarding the 
principle of copyright exhaustion. Both the US Copyright Act (which refers to the 
principles as the first sale doctrine) and European Directives place specific 
restrictions on the rights of copyright owners when it comes to distribution. Finally, 
issues relating to the diversity and composition of popular music and the architecture 
of the Internet itself will be explored. 
 
2. DIGIAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is nothing new when it comes to copyright 
protection and is certainly not synonymous with music. It has arguably been around 
in some way since the 1970s originating in began in the area of software. With the 
advent of microcomputers towards the end of that decade, bespoke hardware and 
software packages became de-bundled with software providers creating standalone 
products that did not require additional technical support1. Early technical means 
 
1 R Anderson Security Engineering (Hoboken: Wiley, 2nd edn, 2008) p 682. 
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here involved utilising a machine’s ‘uniqueness’ (based on its serial number) and 
installation protocols to prevent unauthorised use of software2.  
In the US, early reference was made to it in the Sony Betamax case3 where the 
Supreme Court referred to ‘scrambling’ broadcast signals in order to ‘jam’ the 
recording of television programmes4 which could be seen as an early DRM solution 
(although not ‘digital’ as such).Further efforts persisted in relation to subsequent 
video cassette recorder (VCR) technology with then analogue devices employing 
techniques to interfere with recording synchronisation and subsequently video 
scrambling.5 In the audio industry, the advent of the Digital Audio Tape in the late 
1980s caused concern as it enabled perfect and non-degradable reproduction. This 
resulted in the introduction of a serial copy management systems (SCMS). In the 
early 1990s, these gained legal recognition with the US Audio Home Recording Act 
of 19926 providing for a serial copy management system in all digital audio recording 
devices to prohibit multiple copies being made. 
 
It was only with the development of the Internet and associated digital technologies 
that it felt further protection was warranted in order enhance the effective exercise of 
copyright in the digital environment. The first attempt to conclude an international 
 
2 Ibid, pp 682-683. 
3 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, 464 US 417 (1984). 
4 Ibid, at 495. 
5 Anderson, above n 1, p 691 
6 US Audio Home Recording Act, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), to amend title 17, United States Code, to 
implement a royalty payment system and a serial copy management system for digital audio 
recording, to prohibit certain copyright infringement actions, and for other purposes. 
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agreement in response to the perceived challenges of digital technology was made 
by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and led to the adoption of 
two treaties, which established a common basis for DRM protection: The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT)7 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT)8. The Treaties established, for the first time, that technological protection 
measures (TPMs) used by rightsholders to protect their works enjoy an independent 
protection, as well as providing protection for Rights Management Information (RMI) 
that identifies the work and related copyright information In the United States, 
equivalent measures were introduced in ss1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) in 19989 and in Europe, under article 6 of Information Society Directive10 
(InfoSoc Directive). Both pieces of legislation provide protection for the technological 
measures themselves as well as a prohibition on the manufacture, import and 
distribution of any such device that is primarily intended to facilitate the 
circumvention of such measures.  
 
Indeed, when the idea that ‘the answer to the machine is in the machine’ was 
proposed in 199511 by Charles Clark, legal advisor to the International Publishers 
 
7 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996. 
8 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996. 
9 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), to amend title 17, United States Code, to 
implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, and for other purposes. 
10 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
11 P Goldstein Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, Revised Edition 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp 165-170.   
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Copyright Council, it is questionable if such protections were envisaged. Instead, the 
goal was that technology would not so much control content, but to manage and 
identify the content being used and the users using it. The threats posed by digital 
technologies and the perceived lack of copyright’s enforceability in the online world 
explains why rightsholders turned to such private ordering measures as a form of 
‘front-end’ protection. DRM was therefore a sign that the content industries were 
becoming adept at presenting the digital environment as a threat.12 The extension of 
copyright protection to include such systems along with anti-circumvention provisions 
is indicative of Clarke’s metaphor being taken as a call to action to utilise copyright in 
order to regulate the machine.13 
 
DRM is a generic term referring to a different restrictive measures employed by 
rightsholders to restrict unauthorised use, or copying of, content.14 It involves the use 
of technology to control digital content and although the specific components vary 
from system to system, they can be distilled down to a set of trusted rules attached 
to a digital file that make the use of digital content dependent upon authorisation and 
have the advantage of being self-executing, or independently enforcing.15 It will 
mainly come into play at the last stage of the value chain before delivery to the 
 
12 D Hesmondhalgh The Cultural Industries (London: SAGE Publications, 2nd edn, 2007), p 151. 
13 W Patry How to Fox Copyright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p 233. 
14 See for example, CJ Angelopoulous ‘Modern intellectual property legislation: warm for reform’ 
(2008) Ent LR 19(2) 35-40, p 36 and S Bechtold, ‘Digital Rights Management in the United States and 
Europe’ (2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law 323-382, p 331. 
15 B Kemp ‘Copyright’s Digital Reformulation’ (2002-2003) 5 Yale J L & Tech 141-153, p 144. 
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user16. DRM technologies concern the management of certain ‘permissions’ and may 
more aptly be described as ‘code as code’ through their use by rightsholders to 
restrict user rights.17 Their primary purpose is that of control; mapping the physical 
property restrictions into the digital world, and with their technical and legal elements, 
they may be described in the following way: 
DRM is technical code, backed up by legal code, for the purposes of 
identifying, distributing and protecting digital content and that works by acting as a 
constraint against unauthorised uses of such content.18 
However in the era of music streaming, Rights Management Information (RMI) is 
also integral to DRM systems; in particular as it operates to identify the work, its 
author or copyright owner, or related information about the terms and conditions of 
use of the work. As a result, references to DRM in the context of music streaming 
necessarily include RMI. 
In 2001, the first DRM-protected CD was realised in the UK ‘White Lilies Island’ by 
Natalie Imbruglia on RCA label, which is subsidiary of Sony Music. This used a third 
party technology to prevent the CD from being played or copied on a PC CD-ROM 
drive. Further incidents involving Sony Music emerged in the following years where 
again DRM copy-prevention were measures implemented on audio CDs that were 
 
16 F Koempel, F ‘Digital rights management’ (2005) CTLR 11(8) 239-242, p 239. 
17 P Samuelson ‘Digital Rights Management {and, or, vs.} the Law’ (2003) Communications of the 
ACM 46(4) 41-45, p 42. See also, L Lessig Code Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006) p 116.  
18 N Scharf ‘Digital Rights Management and Fair Use’ (2010) EJLT 1(2).  
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much more invasive; creating security holes and leaving PCs unstable to run.19 Such 
examples are indicative of the pre-existing operation of DRM where it was bundled 
with, or ‘attached’ to, the content it was designed to protect. 
The film industry utilised similar measures. In the 1990s, DVD releases were 
encrypted with the Content Scramble System (CSS) in order to prevent the content 
being copied, played on unauthorised devices and/or in unauthorised regions, but 
had been circumvented in 1999 in the form of DeCSS20. This gave rise a series of 
DRM-focused lawsuits in the US against individuals for making DeCSS publically 
available21 and technology providers for products enabling a DVD to be copied onto 
a computer hard drive22.  
However, the operation of DRM has evolved as new means of distribution and 
consumption have emerged. This is evidenced by more recent controversies, notably 
involving Amazon’s remote deletion of George Orwell’s ‘1984’ from Kindle e-readers 
in 2009,23 which suggests DRM measures are no longer immediately intertwined with 
 
19 S Knopper Appetite for Self-Destruction: The Spectacular Crash of the Record Industry in the 
Digital Age (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009) pp 222-228. 
20 See webpage available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/mail1.txt  
21 Universal v Reimerdes 11 F Supp 2d 294 111 and DVD Copy Control Association Inc v Bunner 116 
Cal App 4th 241. 
22 RealNetworks Inc v DVD Copy Control Association Inc 641 F Supp 2d 913 and 321 Studios v Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc 307 F Supp 2d 1085 (2004). 
23 B Johnson ‘Amazon Kindle users surprised by “Big Brother” move’ The Guardian (17 July 2009, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/17/amazon-kindle-1984. See also ‘Ofcom 
knocks back BBC DRM plans’ (10 November 2009) BBC News, available at: 
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physical media as a consequence of content consumption moving to streaming and 
on-demand-based networks. In particular, streaming has become the dominant 
means by which music content is being consumed. In this context, DRM and 




Music arguably lends itself very well to a streaming-based models as it is generally 
consumed by repeated listening24  and in 2016 revenues from music streaming 
services surpassed those from physical sales for the first time.25 This trend continued 
in 2017 and 2018 with the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) 
stating that streaming revenues grew thirty-four percent in 2018 alone.26 As such, it 
is clear that streaming is the dominant form of music distribution and revenue 
generation online, compared to physical format sales which declined by ten-point 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8352241.stm, and C Arthur ‘Microsoft cutting off up to 1m 
gamers with modified Xbox 360 controls’ (11 November 2009) The Guardian, available at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/11/xbox-modded-consoles-live-cut-microsoft 
24 M Scherzinger ‘Toward a History of Digital Music: New Technologies, Business Practices and 
Intellectual Property Regimes’ in N Cook, MM Ingalls and D Trippet (eds) The Cambridge Companion 
to Music in Digital Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p 49. 
25 International Federation of Phonographic Industries Global Music Report 2017: Annual State of the 
Industry (2017) p 10 available at https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf  
26 International Federation of Phonographic Industries Global Music Report 2019: Annual State of the  
Industry (2019) p 6 available at https://www.ifpi.org/media/downloads/GMR2019-en.pdf  
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one percent in the same year.27 Platforms such as Spotify have contributed to 
‘distracting’ users from downloading content; familiarising them with on-demand 
streaming28 which has now become a major standard in the online distribution of 
digital works; allowing the user to consume the content in ‘real time’.29 As such, this 
suggests that the normative conduct of users is also being channelled into specific 
distribution and consumption channels which the music industry has been searching 
for since the Napster era in the early 2000s when it became clear that: ‘Better 
business models are the Holy Grail of the digital age.’30 Certainly, there is evidence 
of a degree of vertical integration between record labels and intermediaries has 
taken place with the major record labels acquiring equity stakes in Spotify upon its 
inception.31 This is also representative of the music industry acting to mitigate risk 
and this seemingly promotes consumer welfare alongside technological 
developments. 
In this respect, improvements in storage, Internet connectivity and speed, as well as 
consumer preferences have helped familiarise consumers with on-demand content:  
 
27 Ibid, p 15. 
28 M Borghi ‘Chasing copyright infringement in the streaming landscape’ (2011) IIC 42(3) 316-343, p 
317. 
29 Ibid, p 317. 
30 LS Sobel ‘DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers’ (2003) 16 Berkeley 
Tech L J 667-696, p 667. 
31 T Ingham ‘Here’s exactly how many shares the major labels and Merlin bought in Spotify – and 





The kids’ culture is a highly mobile, networked, all-digital, and interactive 
culture, and digital technologies are a tacit standard that is completely and 
unobtrusively integrated into their lifestyles.32  
– the so-called ‘Net generation’.33 Indeed, recent statistics published in 2019 reveal 
that the highest proportion of music streamers are those in the sixteen to twenty-four 
age category where sixty-eight percent of users stream compared to fifty-two percent 
who download and twenty percent who purchase physical copies. This is compared 
to sixty-one percent and forty-five percent who stream music in the twenty-five to 
thirty-four, and thirty-five to forty-four age categories respectively.34 Even in 2016, 
the reach of streamed music among the Net-generation of sixteen to twenty-four 
year olds was effectively double that of twenty-five to thirty-four and thirty-five to 
forty-four year olds.35 The roll-out for 4G in 2013 further enabled this with forty-seven 
percent of 4G users found to have engaged in streaming or downloading 
music/audio compared to twenty-eight percent without 4G connectivity in 2015.36 
 
32 D Kusek and G Leonhard The Future of Music: Manifesto for the Digital Music Revolution (2005, 
Boston: Berklee Press, 2005) p 102. 
33 Ibid, p 99. 
34 Intellectual Property Office Online Copyright Infringement Tracker: Latest wave of research (March 
2019) Overview and key findings, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/86
7708/oci-tracker-2020.pdf  
35 ‘Communications Market Report 2016’ Ofcom (4 August 2016), available at 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/26826/cmr_uk_2016.pdf pp 114-115. 
36 ‘Communications Market Report 2015’ Ofcom (6 August 2015), available at 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/20668/cmr_uk_2015.pdf p 82 
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Streaming operates by utilising technology in a way that does not permit 
downloading.37 In this scenario, content is stored on a central server from where a 
transmission is initialled at the request of a user.38 Content streaming has the 
advantages of efficiency (through compression), leaving no trace of the compressed 
content (unless permitted by the rightsholder) and the ability of control (to access 
streamed content, the user will have to return to the rightsholder’s service).39 Once 
the process of streaming has started, it is a continuous process of transmission,40 
but which nonetheless involves a degree of copying or buffering (whereby a certain 
amount of data is downloaded as an advance supply41) to facilitate the smooth 
receipt and playing of the user’s chosen content. Although this is essentially an act of 
temporary storage, it is not an act of ‘reproduction’ in legal terms; nowhere is a ‘copy’ 
of the content stored or any part of it retrievable by users.42  
As a result, streaming marks an important change from the traditional copy-based 
distribution mechanisms that have previously existed, and which were undermined 
through digital technologies and unauthorised downloading in the early 2000s. In the 
streaming context, a manageable DRM system requires elements such as: rights to 
manage; encryption; licence management; and, a DRM-capable player.43 When a 
 
37 S Stokes Digital Copyright: Law and Practice (Third Edition)’, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 3rd edn, 
2009) p 157. 
38 Borghi, above n 28, p 319. 
39 Stokes, above n 37, p 157. 
40 Borghi, above n 28, p 327. 
41 See website available at https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/buffering  
42 Borghi, above n 28, p 328. 
43 J Ozer, ‘DRM’ (2017) Streaming 14(2) 122-130, pp 122-123. 
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customer plays the content, a licence request is sent to the copyright owner’s proxy 
which communicates with an authentication process to validate the user’s rights to 
the content and release the necessary encryption.44 Here, RMI operates in order to 
enable the content to be played and to track or record information about the content 
being played independently of the content itself. Clearly, compared to its previous 
iterations, DRM in this context has very little to do with controlling ‘serial copies’, but 
rather managing the delivery of musical content and being utilised to design (online) 
conduits for its consumption.45 
The operation of DRM on streaming services has an important adjunct through the 
associated licences that such services offer in order to use their particular service. 
Arguably, a modern and pragmatic copyright regime needs to regulate access46 and 
through the operation of DRM in this respect, the ability of content owners to offer 
and regulate the distribution and consumption of their works may lead to a greater 
number of specialised options and a wider range of consumer choices.47 However, 





44 Ibid, p 125. 
45 Scherzinger, above n 24, p 52. 
46 N Lucchi ‘The supremacy of techno-governance: privatization of digital content and consumer 
protection in the globalized information society’ (2007) IJL & IT 15(2) 192-225, p 211. 
47 MA Einhorn and B Rosenblatt ‘Peer-to-Peer Networking and Digital Rights Management – How 
Market Tools Can Solve Copyright Problems’ (2005), Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 534, p 3. 
14 
 
In theory, DRM allows the market to be encapsulated as one single entity48 so as to 
be able to tailor, more closely, availability and demand49 (therefore mitigating risk 
and improving consumer choice and welfare). DRM provides the ability to design 
different services and offers producers the ability to price discriminate with regard to 
buyer tastes and potentially enable greater revenue recovery.50 With DRM, the 
rightsholder may make a range of choices that directly affect the availability of their 
content.51  and any privileges rightsholders adopt should in theory compete with one 
another in the marketplace (such that the market will no longer be for content, but 
the ‘best’ form of DRM content). A new use ‘equilibrium’ would therefore assert itself 
through a process of experimentation,52 and presumably competition. However, this 
has not proved to be the case as the main streaming content providers appear to 
have largely homogenised licensing terms which are accompanied by DRM 
measures. 
This can be evidenced by more closely looking at the EULAs or terms and conditions 
of service provided by several of the biggest streaming and high-profile services: 
Spotify, Deezer, Pandora, Tidal, Amazon and Apple (through iTunes and Apple 
Music). These have been chosen for analysis owing to the fact that Amazon and 
Deezer are amongst the most popular music streaming services used in the UK 
 
48 JGH Griffin ‘The changing nature of authorship: why copyright law must focus on the increased role 
of technology’ (2005) IPQ 2 135-154, p 145. 
49 P Ganley ‘Digital copyright and the new creative dynamics’ (2004), IJL & IT 12(3) 282-332, p 289. 
50 Einhorn and Rosenblatt, above n 47, p 3. 
51 M Grynberg ‘Property is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization’ 
(2010) 79 Fordham L Rev 435-498, p 481.  
52 G Parchomovsky and PJ Weiser ‘Beyond Fair Use’ (2010) 96 Cornell Law Review 91-138, p 127. 
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according to market research published by the UK Intellectual Property Office53 
(although YouTube and Google Play Music also feature here, they have not been 
included in the sample due to their more recent integration to YouTube Music which 
supersedes Google’s own service54). Similarly, Pandora is amongst the leading 
streaming services in the US (after Apple and Spotify) with 36.8 million users as of 
March 2018.55 Jay-Z’s Tidal service will also be included as an example of an artist-
led initiative. Whilst it has a much smaller presence in the market, it has been 
included for comparison owing to its famous backer (Jay-Z) and its high-profile 
launch in 2015 along with artist stakeholders. Unlike Spotify, it does not offer a 
‘freemium’ option and differentiates its service on creating a better service for fans 
and artists,56 along with tiered pricing based on audio quality.57 Therefore it is worth 
considering if any distinction can be seen in the content of its EULA. 
 
53 Intellectual Property Office Online Copyright Infringement Tracker: Latest wave of research (March 
2018) Overview and key findings, pp 29-30 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/72
9184/oci-tracker.pdf  
54 L Snapes and M Sweney ‘YouTube to launch new music streaming service’ The Guardian (17 May 
2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/may/17/youtube-music-new-streaming-
service-launch  
55 A Watson ‘Most popular music streaming services in the US 2018-2019, by audience’ Verto Statista 
Report (11 March 2020), available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/798125/most-popular-us-
music-streaming-services-ranked-by-audience/  
56 R Iyengar ‘Jay Z Just Launched His Own Music-Streaming Service Called Tidal’ Time (30 March 
2015), available at https://time.com/3764675/tidal-for-all-jay-z-streaming-music-spotify/  
57 A Flanagan and A Hampp ‘It’s Official: Jay Z’s Historic Tidal Launches With 16 Artist Stakeholders’ 




The licence terms of these services are suggestive of the practices of rightsholders 
to deny copy ownership;58 all except Deezer refer to the granting of a non-exclusive 
and/or non-transferable licence to the consumer to make use of the services. In 
particular, Apple states that: ‘Apps made available through the App Store are 
licenced, not sold to you.’ And: ‘… the terms of this standard EULA will govern any 
content, materials, or services accessible from or purchased within the Licensed 
Application.’59 Similarly, Pandora grants a limited, non-transferable and revocable 
licence to access their services through ‘certified applications or intendedmethods.’60 
Spotify also states that:  
Spotify and its licensors retain ownership of all copies of the Spotify software 
applications and Content even after installation on your personal computers, mobile 
handsets, tablets, and/or other relevant devices.61 
Spotify, Deezer, Tidal and Amazon refer specifically to DRM and/or TPM measures 
regarding content available through their services and whilst Apple provides for 
DRM-free content, this is only allowed on a ‘reasonable number of compatible 
devices that you own or control.’62 DRM-free content also has further restrictions 
 
58 A Perzanowski and J Schultz ‘Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property’ (2015) 90 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1213, p 1237. 
59 ‘Licensed Application End User Licence Agreement’ available at: 
https://www.apple.com/legal/macapps/stdeula/ 
60 ‘Pandora Terms of Use’ available at https://www.pandora.com/legal 
61 ‘Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use’ available at https://www.spotify.com/uk/legal/end-user-
agreement/ 




which although allowing use on any number of synched devices, is only permitted on 
a maximum of five computers.63 Deezer states that their free service is only available 
on one connection at a time and that they have the technical means to detect any 
attempts at multiple connections.64 Deezer and Pandora users are also expressly 
bound not to circumvent the services’ technical protection measures or systems65 as 
is also the case with Tidal.66  
Where premium/subscription services enabling downloading are available, 
restrictions are still evident. Deezer refers to ‘temporary downloading’,67 and Tidal to 
‘temporary storage’.68Amazon states that, ‘When you purchase Music Content from 
the Store, you are directing us to store that Purchased Music for you’ and that ‘You 
expressly grant or transfer to us all permissions and benefits necessary to provide 
you cloud-based access to your Music Content.’69  Deezer and Tidal state in addition 
that content cannot be transferred to any other medium.70 Where premium or 
subscription services are offered on Spotify, Deezer, Tidal and Amazon, access to 
such content ceases upon the subscription ending or not being renewed.71 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 ‘Deezer Terms of Use’, available at https://www.deezer.com/legal/cgu  
65 Ibid and above, n 60. 
66 ‘TIDAL – Terms & Conditions of Use’, available at https://tidal.com/terms  
67 Above, n 64. 
68 Above, n 66. 
69 ‘Amazon Music terms of Use’, available at 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201380010  
70 Above, n 64 and n 66. 
71 Above, n 61, n 64, n 66 and n 69. 
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These licences create a number of issues in their own right:72 they create costs in 
reading and understanding, are non-negotiable and arguably indistinguishable such 
that consumers’ ability to draw comparison and make informed decisions are 
undermined. Instead of representing a bargaining process between producers and 
users, they are more representative of the asymmetric power-dynamic between 
producers and users and redefine users’ relationship with content by limiting the 
transfer of the ‘product’ to a series of permissions. This may have a number of 
consequences that will now be explored.  
 
5. CONSEQUENCES 
Most obviously, music streaming services have changed the nature of the product 
that is being offered. Musical content has been de-bundled; from a copy with various 
rights therein, to a series of permissions (covered by DRM and the licences). This 
has consequences for the application for copyright law itself regarding ownership 
and exhaustion issues: ‘The copyright marketplace is rife with examples of 
rightsholders and their intermediaries insisting that consumers do not actually own 
the copies they buy.’73 This has implications for secondary markets for copyright 
content and whilst these may limited in their actual effect, there is also a suggestion 
that the charts are becoming less diverse74  as well as the fact that the composition 
 
72 See A Perzanowski and J Schultz The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016). 
73 Perzanowski and Schultz, above n 58, p 1235. 
74 S Sjölander Did Modern Media Skill the Superstar? A contribution to the theory of consumer 
behaviour in the presence of increasing information (Lund University, 2016), available at 
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of popular music itself may be changing. Beyond this, it can be argued that the 
nature and use of DRM technologies in enabling these business models can impact 
the design principles evident in the development and operation of the Internet. These 
will now be explored in turn. 
 
(a) Ownership and secondary markets 
The success of the music industry has traditionally depended on the sale of copies 
and on user participation through the market; their ownership of copies therefore 
provides a reason for them to do this75. However, this is changing as a result the 
growth of streaming services which has put increased tension on this relationship as 
the tangible copy is no longer the dominant force in the digital music market:76 
 …the physical copy is, and has historically been, the basic unit of 
consumption of a work, and the unauthorized creation of additional units of 
consumption undermines the copyright grant.77 
The growth of streaming distribution removes the ‘copy’ from the equation and it is 
the copy upon which the user has traditionally had possession and control. The 
concept of ‘ownership’ may be seen to have two distinct meanings in copyright. 
 
https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8880948, pp 21-22  See also J Earls, ‘There 
will be no new entries in the Top 40 singles chart this week’ NME (4 July 2016), available at 
https://www.nme.com/news/music/various-artists-170-1192642 
75  Perzanowski and Schultz, above n 58, p 1248. 
76 Ibid, p 1214 and IFPI reports above, n 26. 
 77 J Liu ‘Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership’ (2001) 42 
William & Mary Law Review 1245-1366, p 1280. 
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Specifically, the ‘owner’ of the copyright work is vested with the exclusive economic 
rights of reproduction, distribution etc. as well as the right to authorise third parties to 
perform any of these.78 Copyright’s commoditisation of content also allows 
authorised copies to be bought and sold which leads to the second meaning: 
ownership of the copy as personal property,79 along with the associated doctrine of 
exhaustion which has mediated this space between copyright ownership and 
personal ownership. Although theoretically distinct, copyright ownership and 
ownership of the copy are also invariably linked; what it means to own the copy 
depends on what rights the copyright owner has reserved,80 but: ‘… digital 
distribution changes our relationship to the copy.’81 From looking at the licence terms 
highlighted above, it is evident that users of such music streaming services have no 
personal ownership of the content they may pay for or subscribe to. These licences 
are also largely homogenised and negate any notion of personal property of content 
that may have been ‘purchased’. 
This creates tension with the doctrine of exhaustion that provides a limitation on the 
economic right of distribution that copyright owners are vested with. Article 4(2) the 
InfoSoc Directive and the US in the Copyright Act 197682 state that any subsequent 
distribution of a copy of a work previously put into circulation is not an infringement. 
Therefore, a rightsholder cannot control subsequent distribution of a work once it has 
 
78 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 16. 
79 Perzanowski and Schultz, above n 58, p 1213. 
80 Ibid, p 1223. 
81 Ibid, p 1215. 
82 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (for the general revision of copyright law, title 
17 of the United States Code, and for other purposes), October 19, 1976. 
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already been lawfully sold in the market and this allows secondary markets to form. 
These traditionally operate in respect to tangible copies of works (CDs, DVDs, books 
etc.), that are owned by the consumers who initially purchase them and then wish to 
dispose of them. Owing to the fact that the licence terms of the streaming services 
analysed above do not grant any personal ownership rights to their users, this seems 
to prohibit any such markets being formed for digital music content. 
However, it is questionable whether copyright law permits secondary markets for 
digital products in the first place. Digital technologies are copy-based, therefore 
implicating the right of reproduction over distribution and to which exhaustion does 
not apply. This can also be evidenced by examining recent court decisions on the 
issue from the US and European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Initially, it appeared that secondary markets could exist for digital products, at least in 
the case of computer software. In 2012, the ECJ delivered its judgement in the case 
of UsedSoft v Oracle83 concerning the application of the principle of exhaustion to 
computer programs under article 4(2) of the Computer Programs Directive84 which 
states that the first sale of a program in the Community exhausts the distribution right 
in respect of that copy. In this particular case, Oracle distributed their software online 
such that a customer would download it under a licence agreement permitting the 
right to store a copy of the programme permanently and allowing  a defined number 
of users to access it such that two licences would be required where that number 
would be exceeded. Updates and patches would also be available to download from 
 
83 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. 
84 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs. 
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Oracle’s website and crucially, the licence agreement was stated to last for an 
‘unlimited period’. UsedSoft markets used software licences, including those for 
Oracle’s proprietary software at issue where extra users where required and they 
induced their customers to copy Oracle’s program on to those users’ computers. The 
CJEU was called on to consider if a UsedSoft customer who does not hold a user 
right in Oracle’s program can benefit from the principle of exhaustion so as to 
therefore be a ‘lawful acquirer’ of it under the Computer Programs Directive. 
The Court analysed the nature of the contractual relationship between the Oracle 
and the customer to determine if the downloading of the software amounted to a first 
sale of a copy of the program under article 4(2) of the Directive. It found that the 
downloading of the software and the conclusion of the licence agreement formed 
and ‘indivisible whole’85; especially given the licence granted unlimited duration of 
use. This therefore amounted to a transfer of ownership, regardless of the medium 
(as a download or on a CD-ROM which was a customer option)86. 
Acknowledging the opinion of the Advocate General, the Court noted that if the the 
term ‘sale’ were not given a wide interpretation, the effectiveness of article 4 would 
be hindered as software suppliers would be able to simply circumvent it through 
referring to the contract (of sale) as a licence87. No distinction was made between 
tangible and intangible form88 concerning the product’s format at acquisition although 
 
85 UsedSoft v Oracle, above n 71, para 44. 
86 Ibid, paras 45-47. 
87 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft v Oracle, Opinion of AG Bot, para 59. 
88 UsedSoft v Oracle, above n 71, para 55. 
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the reasoning of the court suggests that this may not be an issue regarding 
exhaustion:  
… the exhaustion of the distribution right … concerns both tangible and 
intangible copies of a computer program and hence also copes of programs which, 
on the occasion of their first sale, have been downloaded from the internet onto the 
first acquirer’s computer.89  
This was because the physical sale and the download were deemed similar from an 
economic perspective90 and was held to cover any relevant updates or patches.91 An 
important proviso exists in that the original user must render their copy unusable at 
the time of resale to avoid infringement under the Computer Programs Directive and 
the InfoSoc Directive,92 which in this context can involve the use of TPMs, whether 
‘classic’ or ‘digital’ to ensure this is the case.93  
Nonetheless, this case has limited applicability. As the Court twice reiterated, the 
legal issues here constituted a lex specialis94 such that the protection of computer 
programs and exhaustion of rights therein are confined to this specific type of 
subject-matter under the Computer Programs Directive and are not extended to the 
InfoSoc Directive. This is seemingly confirmed when read with the case of Nintendo 
v PC Box;95 a case which also involved the legitimacy of devices that circumvented 
 
89 Ibid, para 59. 
90 Ibid, para 61. 
91 Ibid, paras 67-68. 
92 Ibid, para 78. 
93 Ibid, para 79. 
94 Ibid, paras 51 and 56. 
95 Case C-355/21 Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl. 
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TPMs. In that regard, it was deemed that PC Box’s modifications (‘mod chips’) 
circumventing Nintendo’s DRM (operating concurrently between the video game and 
console) enabling third-party applications to be used, is something that article 6 of 
the InfoSoc Directive is designed to protect against. However, it must be determined 
what, if any, other purposes such a circumvention device may be used for and 
whether or not such purposes are purely geared towards copyright infringement or 
something different and/or non-infringing.96  
In contrast to UsedSoft, this case was heard under the InfoSoc Directive and caused 
the Court to consider the type of copyright subject-matter computer games 
constitute. As much as they comprise of a computer program, they were held to be 
‘complex matter’; including audio and graphical components which may ‘have a 
unique and creative value’97. As such, they lie beyond the purview of the Computer 
Programs Directive and this case serves to confine the effect of UsedSoft to purely 
computer programs (and not computer games). As such, early suggestions from the 
industry concerning new secondary markets for computer games were premature. 
When it comes to other categories of copyright works, the cases of ReDigi98 in the 
US along with Art & Allposters99 and Tom Kabinet100 in Europe seem to further 
confirm  a lack of viable secondary markets for digital content in these jurisdictions.  
 
96 Ibid, para 36. 
97 Ibid, para 23. 
98 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc, 934 F Supp 2d 640 (SDNY 2013). 
99 Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright. 
100 C-263/18 Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet 
BV and Others. 
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ReDigi is an online marketplace for pre-owned digital goods that enables registered 
users to trade their legally purchased, but unwanted, digital content (ebooks and 
music) utilising a credit-based system. In 2013, Capitol Records sued the company 
on the basis that its operation amounts to copyright infringement. In much the same 
way as secondary markets for physical media permit, it allows consumers (or in this 
case, users) to recoup the value of their purchases. Presumably then, the doctrine of 
exhaustion would also apply in much the same way.  
The system utilised cloud-based technology for which the user must download 
ReDigi’s ‘Media Manager’ which determined the eligibility of content on the user’s 
computer to be sold. From this list, the user can then upload their eligible files to the 
‘Cloud Locker’ and it was this particular aspect of ReDigi’s operation that the case 
focussed on, with Capitol asserting that this necessarily involved reproduction in 
contravention of the US Copyright Act. For the District Court:  
The novel question presented in this action is whether a digital music file, 
lawfully made and purchased, may be resold by its owner through ReDigi under the 
first sale doctrine. The Court determines that it cannot.101 
Referring to the Napster decision102 as well as citing evidence from the Act itself, its 
legislative history (House and Senate reports), and the ‘laws of physics’103 the 
embodiment of a digital music file on the hard disk of a different user constituted a 
reproduction within the meaning of the Act. However, the case is interesting because 
unlike unauthorised file-sharing and the associated operation of p2p networks, 
 
101 Capitol Records v ReDigi, above n 98, p 4. 
102 A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc, 239 F3d 1004 (2001). 
103 Capitol Records v ReDigi, above n 98, p 6. 
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ReDigi’s users ‘migrated’ their copy of the work to the cloud such that it then ceased 
to exist on the user’s computer (any additional copies would also be deleted). 
Nonetheless, according to the Court: ‘… it is the creation of a new material object 
and not an additional material object that defines the reproduction right.’104 
The application of the first sale doctrine as considered by the Court evidences a 
similarly narrow reading. Given that a ‘new’ copy was created upon upload, the user 
was deemed not to be selling their ‘particular’ (personal) copy of a work105 and that 
defence was therefore inapplicable. The Court held that this defence was limited to 
material items (regardless of the fact that the previously mentioned laws of physics 
dictate that a computer file constitutes a physical location on a hard-disk). As such, 
ReDigi were distributing: ‘…new material objects.’106 This decision was affirmed by 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.107 However, it must be borne in mind that 
the licences described above do not actually permit any personal ownership of a 
‘particular’ copy that could be traded on a secondary digital market. 
Similar reasoning regarding the application of exhaustion and the requirement of 
tangibility can be seen from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
the case of Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright108. This case 
concerned the production and sale of altered versions of copyrighted artworks 
whereby authorised posters of artworks were transferred by Art & Allposters to to 
canvas and sold  online. As framed by the CJEU, the essential question was the 
 
104 Ibid, p 6. 
105 Ibid, p. 12. 
106 Ibid, p 12. 
107 Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc No. 16-2321 (2d Cir 2018). 
108 C-419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictorlight. 
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applicability of article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive in circumstances where the 
original work ‘…has undergone an alteration of its medium.’109 Crucially, the recital 
28 of the Directive makes reference to work incorporated in a ‘tangible article’, 
however just as importantly, the process by which Art & Allposters carried out the 
process meant that the original poster ceased to exist. A synthetic coating was 
applied to the poster such that the artwork was transferred from it to the new canvas 
surface;110 as such, the medium was ‘replaced’111 despite the fact that the physical 
ink was not altered112 and multiple copies were not created. However, the CJEU 
determined that the physical object placed on the market by the rightsholder was 
different to that created by Art & Allposters such that exhaustion did not apply to the 
altered work; it was deemed to be a new reproduction113 in the same way ReDigi’s 
service created a new ‘material object’. In contrast to Usedsoft, the medium and 
‘new’ reproductions (in the literal sense of the word) of the work in these cases were 
centrally important to the decisions.  
The primary mode for secondary markets for copyright content is intrinsically related 
to the medium in which the work was initially put on the market by the rightsholder 
and the forum through which the relevant secondary market may operate. Article 4 of 
the InfoSoc Directive, concerning reproduction, focusses on reproduction of a 
tangible article, as evidenced by recital 28. Any change therein results in the creation 
of a ‘new’ copy that is not subject to the principles of exhaustion, despite the original 
 
109 Ibid, para 23. 
110 Ibid, para 15. 
111 Ibid, para 42. 
112 Ibid, para 44. 
113 Ibid, para 46. 
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copy ceasing to exist. However, recital 29 makes clear exhaustion does not apply to 
online services and this was most recently affirmed in Tom Kabinet.114 Unlike liability 
under the right of reproduction which was the focus in ReDigi and Art & Allposters, 
this case concerned the right of communication. Here, the provision of an online 
marketplace for second hand ebooks was deemed unlawful; the digital content was 
‘made available’ to the public therefore constituting a communication under the 
InfoSoc Directive and established case law115.  
A distinction must, and should, be drawn between both the subject-matter and 
economic rights concerned in these cases. As the AG Szpunar opined in Tom 
Kabinet, in the case of literary, musical or cinematographic works, the usefulness is 
often exhausted, so to speak, after a single reading, hearing or viewing.116 
This can be contrasted with computer programmes which supposedly have a longer 
period of ‘use’, although as AG Szpunar noted, they also become obsolete with 
relatively quickly.117 Nonetheless, digital music and ebooks etc. retain their 
usefulness and by extension economic value to the rightsholder. As a consequence, 
this type of secondary market was deemed to have a much greater value to 
rightsholders.  
These court decisions related to the specifics of the legislation and rights concerned, 
as well as the relevant subject matter, and have largely negated the ability for 
 
114 C-263/18 Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet 
BV and Others. 
115 Ibid, paras 61-72. 
116 C-263/18 Tom Kabinet, Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 61. 
117 Ibid, paras 61-62. 
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independent secondary markets for digital content to develop. As the founders of the 
Tom Kabinet platform noted following the decision, ‘Tom Kabinet’s story ends 
here.’118 
Arguable, streaming platforms themselves are now providing a secondary market for 
content, be it music or other media; a ‘one-stop shop’ where consumers can access 
newly released content, but also older content that they may otherwise have 
acquired through traditional transactions involving physical media. Such paid-for, 
subscription-based, or rightsholder-controlled secondary markets are developing 
across the copyright industries, particularly in TV and movie sectors with the launch 
of new services from Disney (‘Disney+’)119 and ‘BritBox’ in the UK; a joint streaming 
service recently launched by the BBC and ITV.120 This was described by the BBC 
Director General, Lord Hall, as a ‘modern-day’ version of watching a programme on 
television and subsequently purchasing it on DVD.121 However, the difference here is 
the continued remuneration to rightsholders, compared to the exhaustion of their 
rights and therefore remuneration after lawfully putting a copy of a work on the 
market. Unlike secondary markets for physical media, these are virtual markets 
 
118 See webpage available at https://www.tomkabinet.nl/  
119 M Sorrentino and JE Solsman ‘Disney Plus: Everything to know about Disney’s streaming service’ 
CNET (4 May 2020), available at https://www.cnet.com/news/disney-plus-streaming-service-release-
date-price-shows-and-movies-to-expect-hulu-espn-plus/  
120 ‘Full stream ahead for BritBox in UK as ITV and BBC sign agreement’ BBC Media Centre (19 July 
2019), available from https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2019/britbox-agreement  
121 ‘BritBox: ITV and BBC set out plans for new streaming service’ BBC News (19 July 2019), 
available from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-49037855  
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which rightsholders and intermediaries can also exercise control over through the 
use of DRM. 
This is because today’s Internet is arguably mostly concerned with connecting 
people with content,122 rather than providing them with copies of it. DRM ensures 
that streaming platforms can maintain an on-going relationship with users through 
subscription models and as an integral component of content provision.  A music 
stream can be controlled by the rightsholder who can thus condition how a user 
apprehends and consumes content.123 Despite this, many services purport to offer a 
degree of freedom commensurate with personal ownership of music; just as Apple 
advertised ‘Rip. Mix. Burn’ in 2001 with the launch of the iMac, so Spotify today 
advertise ‘Any track, any time, anywhere’124 as well as ‘Listen on the go’ and ‘Play 
your favourites any time’.125 
As mentioned, usage rules should  result from a bargaining process in which users 
are involved. Users may have the benefit of convenience, but this is not a 
consequence of their role in any bargaining process; with unilateral, or bilateral 
decisions taken (by, or between, rightsholders) regarding content distribution and 
 
122 J Kurose ‘Content-Centric Networking’ (2012) Communications of the ACM 55(1), p 116. 
123 JC Ginsburg ‘From having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of an Access Right in 
US Copyright Law’ (2002-2003) 50 J Copyright Soc’y USA 113-132, p 115 and S Dusollier 
‘Electrifying the fence: the legal protection of technological measures for protecting copyright’ (1999) 
EIPR 21(6) 285-297, p 291 
124 J Lowensohn ‘Spotify: Thursday’s the day for US launch’ CNET (13 July 2011), available at 
https://www.cnet.com/news/spotify-thursdays-the-day-for-u-s-launch/  




supported by protective licence agreements. By maximising their return by 
internalising transaction costs through DRM, external costs may be created for 
consumers through restrictive licencing terms as well as potential technological lock-
in126. This leads to increasingly limited ability to seek out alternative markets for 
digital content consumption beyond the subscription-based models currently in 
operation127. Alternatively though, it could just as easily be argued that these 
services have successfully replaced the need for such alternative markets by 
providing consumers with choice, ease and convenience as well as maintaining 
incentives to create and release music.  
Nonetheless, the current market structure perhaps creates further consequences yet 
to be fully felt; relating to musical diversity, musical composition and the very nature 
of the Internet itself and to which attention will now turn. 
 
(b) Musical diversity and composition 
The on-demand nature of streamed music, supported by DRM, suggests that new 
artists may face difficulties if seeking to break into the charts because established 
acts can dominate several chart positions at once following the release of new 
material, which may be ultimately detrimental to musical diversity In this regard, a 
related consequence of streaming is that albums themselves may be de-bundled (or 
 
126 For example, Amazon’s Kindle only supports ebooks from Amazon’s own marketplace. This can 
be altered, but requires third-party software and a degree of technical ability. See webpage at 
https://uk.pcmag.com/ebook-readers/41944/how-to-put-free-ebooks-on-your-amazon-kindle  
127 It should be noted that alternative models do exist such as those supported by Creative Commons 
licensing as well as others, for example, Bandcamp. 
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indeed replaced by ‘playlists’) and the chart-eligibility of streamed music from 2014 
allows the opportunity for this phenomenon to occur when previously it could not.128 
For example, in March 2017 the artist Ed Sheeran occupied sixteen out of the top 
twenty chart positions with songs from his latest album ‘Divide’.129 Similarly, the US 
artist Drake spent fourteen weeks at number one with the track ‘One Dance’ as a 
consequence of streaming consumption when sales only data would have only 
placed it a number one for only three weeks.130 As a result, it has been suggested 
that the charts themselves have stagnated, lack diversity and/or there is a lack of 
quality new artists emerging; for example, a study by the BBC found that in the first 
six months of 2016, there were eighty-six new entries in the UK singles chart 
compared to two-hundred and thirty ten years ago. Similarly, eleven songs reached 
number one in 2016, compared to twenty-six in 2015 and forty-two in 2014.131 The  
examples highlighted above have led to a change in chart eligibility rules for streams 
streamed music with the ration of streams per-play changing from 100:1 to 150:1 for 
newer releases and to 300:1 for older tracks which will apply after three consecutive 
 
128 ‘Streaming and the Official Singles Chart: Everything you need to know!’ Official Charts Company 
(23 June 2014), available at  
129 P Sexton ‘Ed Sheeran Still “Divide”s & Conquers on UK Charts’ Billboard (17 March 2017), 
available at https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/7728615/ed-sheeran-uk-charts-
divide-shape-of-you-number-one  
130 M Savage ‘Has streaming broken the UK singles chart?’ BBC News (17 July 2016), available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-36794105  
131 M Savage ‘Chart company changes formula to reflect rise in streaming’ BBC News (19 December 
2016), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-3836423  
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weeks of declining streams.132 This so-called ‘Accelerated Chart Ratio’ cannot be 
applied to any track that has spent fewer than nine weeks in the chart.133 Whilst this 
may mitigate similar phenomena happening again, the market performance for music 
has a deeper dynamic and is not purely based on ‘popularity’. 
It can also be argued that the music industry has become much more risk-adverse 
following the Napster era when peer-to-peer file-sharing significantly reduced 
revenues. Although these are being restored, the dominance of streaming has also 
affected the composition of popular music, and by extension may impact artists 
themselves. A study by Gauvin in 2017134 established that song intros (i.e. the period 
of time before the vocal appears) have reduced from an average of over twenty 
seconds in the 1980s to an average of five seconds by 2015.135 This research 
utilises theory from ‘attention economics’ highlighting that:  
...in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of 
something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What 
information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. 
 
132 M Savage ‘Ed Sheeran penalised by new chart rules’ BBC News (7 July 2017) available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-40531119. See also ‘Rules for Chart Eligibility: Singles’ 
Official Charts Company (January 2020), p 7, available at 
https://www.officialcharts.com/media/657559/official-uk-singles-chart-rules-jan-2020.pdf 
133 Ibid, p 7. 
134 HL Gauvin Drawing listener attention in popular music: Testing five musical features arising from 
the theory of attention economy (2018) Musicae Scientiae 22(3) 291-304.  
135 M Crane ‘Has music streaming killed the instrumental intro?’ Ohio State News (4 April 2017), 
available at https://news.osu.edu/news/2017/04/04/streaming-attention/ and ‘The dying art of the 




Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate 
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might 
consume it.136 
This is perhaps especially prevalent in with the Internet where: ‘… The economy of 
attention – not information – is the natural economy of cyberspace.’137 With 
streaming services, the attention span of listeners has perhaps decreased as it is 
easy to skip a track if it does not instantly appeal.138 As well as this, there is simply 
an abundance of information, or in this instance music, for the consumer to process; 
Spotify provides streaming to over fifty million songs and access to over two billion 
playlists.139 Whilst this change in composition may be seen to be consistent with 
attention economy principles, it should not necessarily come as a surprise.140 
‘Standards’ or aesthetics in musical composition have changed over the decades 
through evolutions in audience, age and phonographic media formats: ‘… a standard 
develops as the result of its clear location in the popular music consciousness of a 
particular generational cohort at a specific time and place...’.141 By extension, this 
can also explain why certain songs are favoured by certain generations of listeners. 
 
136 HA Simon ‘Designing Organizations for an Information-rich World (1971), p 40, available at 
https://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=33748 
137 MH Goldhaber ‘Attention Shoppers!’ Wired (21 January 1997), available at 
https://www.wired.com/1997/12/es-attention/  
138 Gauvin, above n 134, p 300, citing P Lamere ‘The skip’ Music Machinery (2 May 2014), available 
at https://musicmachinery.com/2014/05/02/the-skip/ 
139 ‘Company Info’ Spotify available at https://press.spotify.com/us/about/  
140 Gauvin, above n 134, p 301. 
141 K Keightley ‘You Keep Coming Back Like A Song: Adult Audiences, Taste Panics, and the Idea of 
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The memory systems of the brain are intrinsically linked to preferences for music first 
heard between the ages of ten and thirty142 which evoke more specific 
autobiographical memories and emotions than music heard in later life;143 the so-
called ‘reminiscence bump’. Streaming therefore provides ample long tail provision of 
content that generationally-orientated users keep returning to. Recent data released 
by the British Phonographic Industry shows that the reach of streaming is 
permeating the long tail of musical content144 with streams of the most popular songs 
from the 1960s-1990s comparing relatively favourably to those of more recent years. 
Spotify’s own studies also reveal that the popularity of newly released music peaks 
its second year of release145 which could indicate more of a ‘slow burn’ in contrast to 
the traditional dominance of ‘hits’ that the chart system is designed to reflect.  
Whilst physical media imbued a certain ‘permanence’ to recordings,146 the shift to 
streaming perhaps lessened this; as a consequence of generational change, rising 
streaming-based consumption and the high levels of competition for listeners’ 
attention. It appears that the key to success is managing listener’s engagement – as 
mentioned above, connecting users with content is necessary at an initial level, but 
 
142 ‘Why the music we love as teens stays with us for life’ BBC Radio 3, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/WYbJdPrX3qn17F1YYK36sS/why-the-music-we-love-as-
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more-so maintaining their attention. Along with the evolution of the chart system and 
the changing composition of popular music, there is clearly a major shift happening 
in the dynamics of the music industry and the market, beyond the initial ‘surge’ in 
frontline sales associated with physical formats. 
 
(c) Internet architecture 
Further consequences may also be felt in relation to the evolution and even the 
operation of the Internet itself. The modern role of DRM may be seen as being aimed 
at the architectural elements of the Internet that are concerned with the efficient 
transport of content147, but the Internet was (arguably) never designed as a 
commercially structured medium for selling digital data.148 DRM operates as a form 
of architectural regulation as architectural distribution mechanisms have developed 
beyond the peer-to-peer architecture common in the 2000s. It was stated in 1995 
that the delivery on demand will be the preferred communication pattern on the 
Internet149 and such ‘transport’ of content now takes place via content streaming, 
with downloading becoming less necessary.150  
 
147 RA Heverly ‘Breaking the Internet: International Efforts to Play the Middle Against the Ends – A 
Way Forward’ (2011) Georgetown Journal of International Law 44 1083-1121, p 1086. 
148 Negativland ‘Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain’ (2003) 66 Law & Contemp Probs 239-
262, p 246. 
149 PB Hugenholtz The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment: Proceedings of the Royal 
Academy Colloquium (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p 91. 
150 Borghi, above n 38, p 317. 
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Arguably, the Internet’s most important feature (and its main strength151) is its open 
architecture: ‘Fortunately, nobody owns the Internet, there is no centralised 
control.’152 Delving into the technical literature associated with the development of 
the technology is instructive in this regard. The Internet is not optimised, instead the 
goals of the network are flexibility and evolvability:153 ‘Systems that are more closed 
tend to allocate power to the owner of the system.’154 It is designed to maximise 
interoperability, and to be independent of software programmes, hardware platforms 
and other technologies. This, ‘… is its greatest virtue since it encourages greater 
participation in the form of new technologies and applications that help shape and 
reshape the entire network.’155 
Related to this is the principle of ‘end-to-end’ (e2e) which has been latent in its 
design for many years.156 This architectural principle was envisaged in the early 
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eighties and described the process whereby: ‘The function in question can 
completely and correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and help of the 
application standing at the endpoints of the communication system.’157 
Put another way, if the system end-points i.e. Internet users, cannot be trusted, then 
this may imply the development of mechanisms on the network itself to enforce 
‘good’ behaviour158 through interventions to protect copyright159. This implicates 
DRM as a network issue: ‘As trust erodes, both end-points and third parties may 
wish to interpose intermediate elements into a communication to achieve verification 
and control.’160 
As mentioned previously, DRM’s role in relation to content streaming can create 
technological lock-in and such power concentration has been noted by the Internet 
Architecture Board (IAB) as being a ‘concerning phenomenon’ as recently as 
September 2020.161 Issues here relate to hardware and software ecosystems; the 
stream of data must be routed through the device which must have some ability to 
see what sort of information is in the stream so it can make the necessary 
processing decisions.162 Although there is not a readily apparent relationship 
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between this and the role of copyright itself, the anti-circumvention provisions 
highlighted above now provides this link such that circumventing such a system is an 
offence in the same way that copyright infringement may be illegal, and as a 
consequence it can also be used to regulate technologies to create and maintain 
such ecosystems. Apple has become an important digital gatekeeper for the content 
industries;163 through transforming itself from a technology-based company, to an 
entertainment-based one.164 Steve Jobs himself came to play a major role in shaping 
the strategy of rightsholders,165 although ironically, he did not favour a subscription-
based distribution model.166 The role of DRM also contributed to this, initially through 
attempts to develop the ‘Secure Digital Music Initiative’ (SDMI) as a standard 
encryption format for music files in 2002.167 Although this ultimately ended without 
agreement due to the conflicting interests of those involved, that did not mean that 
the issue faded: 
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to most of the panel members, another group of 
smart, hi-tech business people was watching the proceedings very, very carefully. It 
was Apple Computer... [who] decided they could do a far better job.168 
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Apple’s then proprietary ‘FairPlay’ DRM system benefitted them much more than the 
labels as it locked consumers into Apple products.169 This ‘lock-in’ created an Apple 
‘ecosystem’ that essentially tied its product range together for commercial 
transactions170 (originally driven by the iPod171) such that that they  were mutually 
reinforcing. Originally, this was between Apple’s iTunes software and the iPod,172 but 
now extends to their other technology products (in particular the iPhone and iWatch) 
which have strengthened their ecosystem.  
This is also how Apple operates; entering a new market and refining its products and 
services until it yields success.173 This interconnected nature of Apple’s products and 
services is an important part of their business strategy,174 as well as the rigidity of 
their business practice: ‘Apple is a stalwart on its pricing scheme.’175 They have now, 
however, spun out their iTunes service into four distinct parts (Apple Music, Apple 
Podcasts, Apple TV and Finder) to further drive users into their software and 
services.176 Music consumption is no longer about ripping, mixing and burning, but 
again connecting users with content on proprietary platforms and networks. This 
interconnected nature between products and content (even if the content is DRM-
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free) therefore highlights the importance of rightsholder-controlled digital distribution 
networks on which the rightsholder and/or streaming platform is most likely to add 
services (and thus constraints) by modifying the part of the network that they 
control.177  
This may lead to what Sir Tim Berners-Lee has referred to as ‘fragmentation’ and 
whilst he was referring more specifically to social media sites, the same analogy 
could be applied in this context: ‘The more you enter, the more you become locked 
in…’, and referring to iTunes, ‘You are trapped in a single store, rather than being on 
the open marketplace.’178 Therefore, streaming-based distribution of music 
(supported by DRM and licences) may threaten to create network fragmentation 
whereby centralised and closed distribution networks are prevalent and where DRM 
operates on the network itself. All of this in contrast to the decentralised, open and 
e2e-designed network that originally developed. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The growth of streaming-based music consumption is unlikely to change; it is the 
dominant mechanism by which such content is consumed online and the recording 
industry is dependent on its success, especially bearing in mind the major labels 
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have equity stakes in Spotify.179 DRM plays an important role in this context; 
enabling such business models in the first place and subsequently protecting and 
managing the content offered on such platforms. In contrast to its early incarnations 
it now operates as an ‘omnipresent connectivity’180 and is an inescapable 
necessity.181 Digital networks can now be designed to mirror the traditional industry 
market norms182 and re-establish the market practices and market regulation that 
were threatened by digital technology. Such a content-centric network focuses on 
what a user wants with increasing concentration on the delivery of content.183 A 
successful network may increase the available choices to the user, but conversely, 
restrict interoperability,184 such that user choices are limited amongst streaming 
providers and their proffered content. Such restrictions are also evident through the 
associated licencing terms that these services offer; there is no need for them to 
offer more freedoms when they can simply introduce further restrictions in order to 
appeal to the record labels, as rightsholders, who they depend on for content 
provision.  
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Such choices may interfere with the ‘value’ of a piece of music as this arises as a 
result of its utility through consumption:185 “People want to be engaged with their 
content ... They want to engage in an ongoing relationship...”186 However, the 
development of streaming-based and DRM-supported content distribution changes 
this dynamic. DRM may affect users’ perceptions of their rights;187 changing their 
normative behaviour alongside the underlying architecture of digital content 
consumption:  
‘Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than among young people who 
have grown up in a digital world and, in some cases, cannot relate to the physical 
objects of the past.’188 
As has been shown, the operation of DRM in conjunction with licence agreements 
may have few consequences regarding secondary markets, but more so music chart 
diversity, musical composition, and threatening the fundamental design principles of 
the Internet. However, the success seemingly enjoyed by streaming providers 
suggests that these do not seem to be of much (if any) concern to the general public 
and users of such services; overall, streaming services seem to create a lower 
inventive to illegally download music. Music on physical media also continues to 
exist and in  the case of vinyl, has enjoyed a degree of resurgence in the UK due to 
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the COVID pandemic.189 Nonetheless, these individual issues can be seen at a 
macro-level that is indicative of a re-establishment of record industry power allied to 
streaming platforms. This trend is likely to continue and present broader level, 
unique problems that are related to those already highlighted.  
Issues such as streaming piracy, click fraud and the ‘value gap’ have all emerged in 
recent years and whilst there are attempts to mitigate these in the form of the new 
Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market,190 problems may still remain. The 
Internet has enabled artists to innovate how they present their work to consumers, 
but the movement to streaming arguably makes this more difficult. In 2014, the US 
band Vulfpeck released their album ‘Sleepify’ on Spotify. The album consisted of ten 
songs of silence lasting between thirty-one and thirty-two seconds which they asked 
their fans to stream on repeat in order to generate sufficient royalties to fund an 
admission-free tour.191 The album was subsequently removed from the service for 
violating their terms of content.192 Although these services offer services for artists 
themselves, for unsigned acts they involve third parties (who handle licencing and 
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distribution for a fee or percentage).193 Even with direct distribution schemes like 
those offered by Spotify since 2018194 complexities exist and artists may still receive 
slightly less than the major record labels.195 Controversies over royalty payments 
and mechanisms suggest that only artists who are globally established have any 
bargaining power196 against these services. It could also be argued that simply being 
a talented musician is no longer enough; new artists perhaps now need a 
background in, or require education on, the technology and business practices 
involved in the streaming-based landscape. They may subsequently find themselves 
competing for the attention of potential fans through these services and being forced 
to conform to associated compositional necessities. This may also jeopardise older 
artists who either lack familiarity with current practices and technologies, or whose 
work does not conform to modern standards; artists whose work lies in the long tail 
that current trends seems to be ignoring and which streaming may either help or 
exacerbate.  
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This is being driven, in part by DRM, but more broadly by the interrelationship 
between the record industry and streaming platforms197. Copyright also remains 
centrally important here, but its focus is no longer on enforcing reproduction rights 
because the ‘copy’ has been removed from the equation. Technologies and 
intermediaries have now evolved around copyright law. The locus of copyright in this 
context moving towards the immediate bundle of rights acquired that enable online 
exploitation, but with little opportunity for copyright’s in-built balancing mechanisms 
to operate.  
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